FCA: Non-Equity Transparency Proposals
08 January 2024
The FCA is consulting on proposals to amend the MiFID II non-equity transparency framework. This FCA consultation follows UK changes to equity market structure (please see our briefing here) and also the parallel changes that are being proposed in the EU (please see our briefing here). The equity market structure changes are particularly relevant for the second half of the consultation paper that focuses on post-trade flags – as the thinking in that space has been (usefully) borrowed.
The FCA has clearly given a lot of thought to many aspects within this consultation paper. For trading venues and APAs, there is potentially a lot of operational change. For those who wished for a sea change in transparency it is unclear whether this consultation paper will deliver that; the FCA has worked to ensure that transparency is maintained on the largest derivative asset classes. On bonds, high levels of transparency on both the pre-and post-trade side is the conscious policy aim. The exception to this is the confusing approach to RFQ/Voice systems. There is a bit of work to be done to explicitly tease out from the FCA how they view the negotiated trade waiver working with these systems.
The FCA is proposing to revise the current transparency framework. Under the current framework, bonds/derivatives are subject to pre-and post-trade transparency where they are traded on a trading venue (i.e. "TOTV").
The FCA promises the new framework will be less complex (complexity here, presumably, being a relative term…).
The FCA proposes a two category division for defining the scope of the regime:
i) Trading venues will be expected to provide adequate pre and post-trade transparency in relation to all transactions executed under their systems but can set the sizes at which this transparency is waived themselves. The FCA has set out factors to be taken into account by trading venues in establishing these pre-trade transparency requirements. This means that different trading venues may have different pre-trade transparency levels. A similar "handing back of control" to trading venues can be seen with position limits in the FCA's separate commodity position limit CP.
ii) Investment firms are not required to publish a post-trade report in relation to Category 2 instruments.
All bonds that are traded on a trading venue are Category 1. Therefore, all TOTV bonds are subject to pre-and post-trade transparency for trading venues, but only post-trade transparency for investment firms dealing OTC. So, practically speaking, no change in scope for bonds.
Investment firms and trading venues will continue to be subject to transparency obligations for these instruments, albeit changed levels in terms of pre-trade waivers (noted below under the pre and post trade transparency sections).
The FCA note this is what industry wanted; if you disagree, now is the time to do so.
There's a bit more change here.
The FCA proposal is similar in scope to the EU current proposals: the transparency regime should focus on derivatives that are cleared i.e. if the derivative is subject to the clearing obligation, it is a Category 1 instrument i.e. subject to pre and post trade transparency. The new regime also will include benchmark and broken tenors.
The FCA proposes to exclude forward rate agreements, fixed-to-floating IRSs (other than those based on EURIBOR), basis swaps and OIS based on Japanese Yen (Tokyo Average Overnight Rate (TONA OIS)) from the list of Category 1 instruments.
Category 1 instruments would not include derivatives that are not subject to the UK clearing obligation. For example, FX derivatives / single name CDS are Category 2 instruments.
The FCA proposes to insert a new chapter in the MAR handbook: MAR 11 (Transparency rules for transparency instruments). This is a good thing in trying to consolidate the rules in one place.
Under both Category 1 and Category 1, trading venues have to provide "adequate pre-trade transparency information". What this means is then set out in a table (MAR 11.2.3) which is similar in many respects from the existing MiFID II rules. So what's the difference? Well…
The points made above in relation to bonds, will apply to Category 1 derivatives (i.e. derivatives that are cleared).
Trading venues in relation to Category 2 derivatives (such as FX derivatives) have scope to set their own large in scale pre-trade waiver. The FCA has given guidance on this/or rules to follow which will need to be taken into account by trading venues; it will be interesting to see whether there is a convergent market view across the different tenors/subclasses of Category 2 derivatives.
The illiquid and SSTI waiver is as above removed.
The FCA has the power to turn on pre trade transparency requirements for SIs and to provide waivers under FSMA 2023 Schedule 2 Part 1, but has not yet done so. If it were to do so at a later date, the transparency thresholds would have some reference to what was agreed in relation to this CP.
The FCA has presented the market with some policy choices in relation to post-trade transparency. Currently, there are two alternatives to the present framework - on the table for Category 1 Instruments (investment firms do not have to post-trade report Category 2 instruments, and trading venues can determine their individual post-trade deferral times for Category 2 instruments).
The FCA describes the alternatives as models:
a) below both LIS thresholds is reported in real time i.e. price and size info (small trades);
b) above the first LIS Threshold but below the second LIS Threshold is reported within 15 minutes for price information but not size information (medium size trades). The size information is reported, in the case of bonds by the end of the third day (T+3) and, in the case of derivatives by the end of the day;
c) that is above both LIS Thresholds can rely upon an extended deferral for both price and size (large trades). In the case of bonds, this would be a four week deferral for both price and size information, in the case of derivatives until the end of the third day after execution.
a ) below the LIS threshold is reported in real time;
b) above the LIS but below the cap, is reported with the price and size after deferral period. The current proposal is an end of day publication requirement for both bonds and derivatives;
c) above the cap will only report that the execution size is above the cap and not provide specific size/volume information for derivatives or bonds.
One view of the above models is that they could be quite different or more or less the same depending on the calibrations. The second model appears to provide greater protection for very large trades as it masks size visibility. However, if the calibration was adjusted to a high level for the cap, the distinction between Model 2 and Model 1 might be felt to be less significant.
The FCA notes that the current framework for calibrating when a bond is LIS is based on a blunt methodology - the result is that thresholds are too high for certain less liquid bonds and too low for most liquid ones. The FCA proposes to replace the current factors they used to assess bonds with the following:
What this looks like is the following:
Issuer | Issue Size | Maturity | Price and size in real time | Price: 15 mins Size: T+3 Price and size |
Price and size 4 weeks |
UK, France, Germany, Italy and USA | >£1bn | <5yrs | <£15m | £15m≤●<£50m | ≥£50m |
5-15yrs | <£10m | £10m≤●<£25m | ≥£25m | ||
>15yrs | <£5 | £5m≤●<£10m | ≥£10m | ||
All other instruments | <£2m | £2m≤●<£4m |
≥£4m |
Currency | Issuer Rating | Issue Size | Price and size in real time | Price and size in real time |
Price and size 4 weeks |
GBP, EUR & USD | IG | >£500m | <£1m | £1m≤●<£10m | ≥£10m |
All other instruments | <£500k | £500k≤●<£5m | ≥£5m |
Issuer | Issue Size | Maturity | Price and size in real time | Price: EOD Size: EOD |
UK, France, Germany, Italy and USA | >£1bn | <5yr | <£15m | ≥£15m (cap at £50m) |
5-15yr | ||||
>15yr | <£10m | ≥£10m (cap at £25m) | ||
All other instruments | <£5m | ≥£5m (cap at £10m) | ||
<£2m | ≥£2m (cap at £4m) |
Currency | Issuer Rating | Issue Size | Price and size in real time |
Price: EOD Size: EOD |
GBP, EUR & USD | IG | >£500m | <£1m | ≥£1m (cap at £10m) |
All other instruments | <£500k | ≥£500k (cap at £5m) |
The FCA CP usefully gives some examples at page 46 of the paper for those that want more detail. For example, a £5m trade in a GBP denominated corporate bond with an issuance size above £500k and an issuer with an IG credit rating:
As currently calibrated both models are designed to give high levels of transparency. The FCA notes: "both models deliver an identical high level of real-time post-trade transparency. Our proposed regime delivers real-time price transparency for between 75% and 92% of the trades, depending on the group, and between 4% and 20% of the volume."
There are a number of factors for market participants to consider, such as whether the FCA should take into account other variables when setting the factors used to assess LIS, whether the cap is at the right level under Model 2 and whether more generally the LIS thresholds will help or penalise liquidity. Whatever market participants views, responses to the FCA will need to be supported by robust data.
The CP sets out the equivalent picture for derivatives at pages 48.
The FCA has carried over much of its thinking in relation to post-trade reporting from the equity market into this CP. The majority of the amendments seem safe and tested ground.
This means that there are drafting clarifications and amendments in relation to post-trade reporting on give-ups, cross-fund transfers and affiliate trades. In particular, the drafting amendments in relation to give-ups for RFMD that was modelled in the revised equity framework has been carried across.
There are also amendments to the post-trade flags - including in relation to when and how the UPI identifier should be used with the ISIN code. The FCA, for example, notes that UPI is useful for identifying OTC derivatives (this tracks wider conversations on EMIR revisions) but is not excluding ISINs elsewhere.
The FCA has set out some guidance on its revised SI definition. This should be taken into account by investment firms. There are a few helpful notes within this guidance. In particular, the confirmation that "degree of automation" does not necessarily lead to SI status and what is in effect a close "holding out test" i.e. whether the firm is advertising itself as dealing on own account as an SI.
The FCA also introduces a number of factors for firms to consider in relation to the SI test, these include:
The information provided is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in the law and practice, or to cover all aspects of those referred to.
Readers should take legal advice before applying it to specific issues or transactions.