To tell or not to tell Part 1 - When to report knowledge of a criminal offence
16 April 2020
16 April 2020
In the first of a two part series, we look at the reporting obligations which apply when you become aware of a serious indictable offence. In Part 2, we consider the pros and cons of a voluntary report when reporting obligations do not apply.
It is not uncommon for a corporation to stumble across information relating to the commission of a serious corporate crime in the course of doing business. For example, this can happen when:
The general rule is that a corporation (or its employees or officers) is under no obligation to report a suspected criminal offence.
The general rule is displaced in NSW by section 316(1) of the Crimes Act (NSW), which makes it an offence not to report a serious indictable offence. The offence is unique to NSW – no other Australian jurisdiction compels the reporting of an offence.
The offence contains four elements, as follows:
We examine each element below.
Section 316(1) was amended in 2018 to apply to "an adult" rather than "a person" – recognising that children are particularly vulnerable to being pressured into not reporting another person's offending and may not understand when they have information that might be of material assistance.
It may be arguable that this amendment had the unintended effect of also carving out corporations. We consider corporations should treat the obligation as applicable to them – not least because any information held by the company will be held by individual adults (ie. directors and officers) to whom the offence does apply.
A "serious indictable offence" is one that "is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more" (section 4 of the Crimes Act (NSW)).
The "serious indictable offence" must have a "geographical nexus" with NSW (section 10C(2) of the Crimes Act (NSW)). This exists where the offence:
Examples in the business setting include various fraud offences in Part 4AA of the Crimes Act (NSW), larceny and embezzlement (ss 156 and 157) and documentary offences such as making, using or possessing a false document (ss 253, 254 and 244). It is not clear whether offences under Commonwealth statutes, or laws of other jurisdictions, are also covered.
The "place" in which an offence is committed is the "place in which the physical elements of the offence occur" (section 10B of the Crimes Act (NSW)).
The place in which an offence has "effect" includes:
The definition of "effect" in section 10B(3) has not been the subject of much judicial consideration. The NSW District Court has described section 10B(3) as "an omnibus provision which incorporates great scope for flexibility of interpretation, [which] is inconsistent with how statutes imposing criminal sanctions are customarily construed" (Smith v NSW [2016] NSWDC 55 at [105]-[113]).
"Believes" is not defined in the Crimes Act (NSW). The case law has set a particularly low bar, requiring only subjective belief that a serious indictable offence had been committed without requiring that belief be reasonably held. The High Court in George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 117 held that the assent of belief "is given on more slender evidence than proof".
It has been held in other contexts that "reasonable excuse" is not confined to physical or practical difficulties in complying with the statutory prescription. For example, for individuals it would include situations covered by the privilege against self-incrimination – that is, if reporting the offence would incriminate the person reporting the offence (such as where that person participated in the offence). For a corporation, a reasonable excuse may include that it believed on reasonable grounds that the information was already known to the police. Privilege against self-incrimination is not available for corporations: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1316A; Uniform Evidence Acts, s 187; see also Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Limited (1993) 178 CLR 477.
Section 316(2) of the Crimes Act (NSW) makes it an offence for a person (including a corporation) to solicit, accept, or agree to accept, any benefit in exchange for not reporting a serious indictable offence. This prohibits (among other things) a quid pro quo between a company and an employee or an opponent in a dispute, where the company may wish to use the threat of reporting as leverage to be compensated for loss.
There are similar provisions in all Australian jurisdictions other than South Australia.
Authors: Rani John, Partner; Ian Bolster, Partner; Stephen Speirs, Senior Associate; Joshua Kang, Lawyer, Phimister Dowell, Lawyer
The information provided is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in the law and practice, or to cover all aspects of those referred to.
Readers should take legal advice before applying it to specific issues or transactions.