Ashurst and Practical Law Company Q1 2022
21 April 2022
The articles below were written by Ashurst LLP and Practical Law Corporate in Q1 2022 and first published in the company law section of PLC Magazine, the leading monthly magazine for business lawyers advising companies active in the UK.
Summary. The Companies (Strategic Report) (Climate-related Financial Disclosure) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/31) (the Company Regulations) and the Limited Liability Partnerships (Climate-related Financial Disclosure) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/46) (the LLP Regulations) (together, the 2022 Regulations) have been published. The Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) has issued guidance to help companies and LLPs meet the mandatory climate-related financial disclosure requirements (the guidance).
Background. In June 2017, the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure published its final report containing recommendations that businesses voluntarily and consistently provide climate-related financial disclosures in their annual financial reports to interested parties such as investors and lenders (the recommendations).
BEIS consulted on climate-related financial disclosures by publicly quoted companies, large private companies and limited liability partnerships (the consultation) in March 2021, and published its response in October 2021.
Facts. The 2022 Regulations require in scope companies and limited liability partnerships (LLPs) to disclose climate-related financial information in their annual financial reports in line with the recommendations.
The Company Regulations are in substantially the same form as the draft version published in October 2021 and will apply to:
The LLP Regulations will apply to:
The 2022 Regulations come into force on 6 April 2022. They will apply in respect of any financial year of a company or LLP commencing on or after that date.
The guidance is non-binding and aims to help companies and LLPs to meet the requirements of the 2022 Regulations. It covers, among other things:
Summary. The High Court has held that a non-executive chair was unfit for the purpose of section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (1986 Act) (section 6) and disqualified him for four years.
Background. Under section 174 of the Companies Act 2006 Act (2006 Act), a company director must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence (the section 174 duty). This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with both:
Every director must show the knowledge, skill and experience set out in the objective test. Where a director has specialist knowledge or is particularly experienced, the subjective test enhances the objective test and a higher standard applies to that director. Directors must keep themselves informed about the company's affairs. They can delegate tasks provided that the delegating director supervises the delegation and assesses the end result (Re Keeping Kids Company [2021] EWHC 175 (Ch); Sharp v Blank [2019] EWHC 3096 (Ch)).
The court can disqualify directors of a company that has become insolvent if their conduct makes them unfit to manage a company (section 6(1)). In evaluating this, the court will consider the matters specified in Schedule 1 to the 1986 Act (section 12C, 1986 Act). The court must determine whether a director's conduct has fallen below the required standards of probity and competence (Re Grayan Building Services Limited (in liquidation) [1995] Ch 241). The burden of proof rests on the Secretary of State, to the ordinary civil standard. The minimum period of disqualification is two years and the maximum period is 15 years (section 6(4)).
Facts. In 2012, DS and AS ran a water equipment and purification business through a limited company, X. The shares in X were held by DS's partner and AS's wife. The directors included A and B, B having been approached to be a non-executive director (NED). Among other things, B helped to introduce new shareholders to X and signed annual accounts on behalf of the board.
X expanded its business to include the supply of pumping equipment for use in fracking and, between September 2012 and March 2013, it entered into 28 separate transactions (the 28 deals). HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) suspected X of involvement in a missing trader intracommunity (MTIC) fraud because of its involvement in the 28 deals. HMRC's investigation led to the cancellation of X's VAT registration, the disallowance of input tax on the 28 deals and the raising of penalties and assessments against X. In 2015, X ceased trading and, in 2016, it went into creditors' voluntary liquidation with creditors owed £4.1 million.
B remained a director until January 2016. In 2015, B had been the sole director of X from February until November when DS was appointed director, although DS was later adjudged to have been at all material times before his appointment a de facto director. A had resigned as a director in October 2012 but had continued as an employee. AS was a director between October 2012 and May 2013.
The Secretary of State (SoS) applied for A, B, DS and AS to be disqualified as company directors.
B argued that, as a NED, he had taken no active part in the day-to-day management of X but instead had delegated responsibility for X's operations to his fellow directors.
Decision. The court held that A, DS and AS were unfit for the purpose of section 6 and disqualified them for 11 years, 14 years and 13.5 years respectively. It held that B was unfit for the purpose of section 6 and disqualified him for four years.
On the facts, the 28 deals were connected to MTIC fraud and DS, AS and A had known that these deals were connected to the fraudulent evasion of VAT.
There were no written terms of engagement setting out B's precise role. However, the court discerned that B's role as a NED in X included protecting shareholders' investments and ensuring that the business was run properly with a view to eventually preparing X for a possible flotation.
In addressing B's shortcomings as a director, the court noted that B had failed to inform himself adequately about the business, including failing to investigate the reasons for a dramatic leap in turnover attributable to the 28 deals. Until a meeting he attended with HMRC in 2013, he was unaware of the 28 deals although, earlier that year, he had signed X's accounts, which encompassed 27 of the deals. B's failure to investigate was a reprehensible abrogation of duty, particularly given his role of protecting shareholders' investments and preparing X for a future flotation. B had failed to obtain basic information that any NED would require to inform themselves as to how the business was being run by those to whom it had been delegated.
B had repeatedly failed to engage with HMRC, including failing to respond to correspondence specifically addressed to him and only being available for one meeting between October 2013 and X's liquidation. B had continued to leave matters to DS and AS, even when advised that DS was not co-operating with HMRC. In the context, this was also an abrogation of duty by B.
B's previous distinguished business career should have no material effect on the length of his disqualification period given his continuing lack of appreciation of what went wrong and his unapologetic stance.
Comment. This decision reiterates that neither the 2006 Act nor the 1986 Act make any explicit distinction between the duties owed by executive directors and NEDs, and that the term "directors" includes de facto directors or directors in fact; that is, those who assume responsibility to act as directors although they are never actually appointed.
The decision is a stark reminder of the difference between knowing what one's duties as a director are and doing enough to discharge them. Although B had little operational involvement and was not an executive director, aspects of his role, compounded by his experience and qualifications, served only to increase expectations of him. Under the section 174 duty, B had to do more, not less. He should have made proper investigations into X's situation, acted on warning signs and engaged properly with HMRC. In acting, or failing to act, as he did, B breached his duties. As this was a director disqualification case rather than a breach of duty or misfeasance case, there was no need to prove loss to X by reason of B's breach of duty.
Summary. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has issued a report on the quality of corporate governance reporting by private companies (the report).
Background. In December 2018, the FRC published the Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large Private Companies (Wates Principles). The introduction to the Wates Principles sets out the requirement in the Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/860) (2018 Regulations) for in-scope private companies to include a statement of corporate governance arrangements in the directors' report.
Facts. The report was commissioned to identify which companies within the scope of the 2018 Regulations provided a corporate governance statement for financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2019. Although it is too early to draw many conclusions as a lot of companies were in their first cycle of reporting, the report highlights that there is much room for improvement. In particular, it suggests that companies need to:
The report also includes examples of good reporting.
Summary. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has issued a report on corporate culture (the report).
Background. In July 2016, the FRC published a report on the relationship between corporate culture and long-term business success.
Facts. The report draws on the experiences and views of leading companies and is intended to showcase some of the actions they are taking to better communicate their culture and link it to their strategic objectives. Key conclusions in the report include that:
Based on its findings, the FRC will consider what further action to take, including any amendments to its guidance on board effectiveness. It also plans to monitor corporate disclosures in this area.
Source: FRC: Creating Positive Culture: Opportunities and Challenges
Summary. The FTSE Women Leaders Review has issued its first report on gender balance in FTSE leadership (the report).
Background. In February 2021, the Hampton-Alexander review issued its fifth and final annual report on improving gender balance in FTSE leadership (www.practicallaw.com/w-030-2280).
In November 2021, the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy announced government support for a new five-year independent review, the FTSE Women Leaders Review, to monitor the representation of women among leaders of FTSE 350 companies, focusing on both board membership and senior leadership roles.
Facts. The report states that:
The report also announced new recommendations, including:
Source: FTSE Women Leaders Review Achieving Gender Balance
Summary. The Investment Association (IA) has published its 2022 principles of remuneration (the principles).
Background. The IA updates the principles annually in advance of the next AGM season and the last principles were published in November 2020 (the 2021 principles).
Facts. The principles amend the 2021 principles, including changes to the following areas:
Comment. It is interesting to see that, for the first time, the principles expressly set out investors' views on VCPs, but those views are unsurprising.
Source: IA: Principles of remuneration for 2022
Summary. Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) has issued its UK proxy voting guidelines for 2022 (2022 guidelines).
Background. In November 2020, ISS published its guidelines for 2021. ISS revises the guidelines annually.
Facts. The 2022 guidelines set out climate management proposals on: climate shareholder proposals; board accountability on climate, board gender and ethnic diversity; and the use of environmental, social and governance performance conditions in variable remuneration schemes.
The ISS has also changed its policy for investment companies by removing share issuance proposals that involve the issue of C shares from its general approach to resolutions seeking authority to issue equity.
The 2022 guidelines will be effective for meetings held on or after 1 February 2022.
ISS intends to publish full updated policy documents for 2022 in due course, and to release more information about its new climate-related policies before they come into effect.
Source: ISS: Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA): Proxy Voting Guidelines for 2022
Summary. The Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (PLSA) has issued its 2022 stewardship and voting guidelines (2022 guidelines).
Background. In March 2021, the PLSA published its 2021 stewardship and voting guidelines (2021 guidelines). The PLSA updates its guidelines annually.
The Hampton-Alexander review is an independent business-led initiative supported by the government, which was initiated in 2016 with the purpose of increasing the representation of women in senior leadership positions and on boards of FTSE 350 companies.
In November 2016, the Parker review recommended that, among other things, there should be at least one director from a minority ethnic group on each FTSE 100 board by 2021 and on each FTSE 250 board by 2024.
In June 2017, the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) developed recommendations on climate-related disclosures (the TCFD recommendations) relating to governance, strategy, risk management, metrics and targets.
Facts. Changes to the 2021 guidelines include the following amendments:
Source: PLSA: Stewardship and Voting Guidelines 2022
Summary. Glass Lewis has published its 2022 proxy paper guidelines (2022 guidelines) setting out its approach to proxy voting for 2022 in the UK.
Background. In November 2020, Glass Lewis published its proxy paper guidelines for 2021 (2021 guidelines). The guidelines are updated annually.
Facts. The 2022 guidelines amend the 2021 guidelines to include the following:
Source: Glass Lewis: 2022 Policy Guidelines
Summary. Glass Lewis has issued an updated version of its guidance on executive compensation for the Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (the updated guidance).
Background. In January 2021, Glass Lewis published guidance on executive compensation for the EMEA region in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (the 2021 guidance), which addressed the application of Glass Lewis's existing policies to executive compensation under a number of expected scenarios.
Facts. The updated guidance states that the 2021 guidance will apply throughout the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly for companies and industries that continue to be affected by the pandemic. Specific references to fiscal years have been removed.
For companies that continue to be affected by the pandemic, Glass Lewis has clarified that, when assessing a board's decisions on executive compensation, it will expect, among other things, overall lower outcomes than compared to pre-pandemic levels. This is as opposed to expecting lower outcomes than in the previous year.
Source: Glass Lewis: Approach to Executive Compensation in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic
The information provided is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in the law and practice, or to cover all aspects of those referred to.
Readers should take legal advice before applying it to specific issues or transactions.